The Observatory releases its first Literature Bulletin in the field of Administrative Law on topics related to better regulation and regulatory agencies. The Bulletin reports on papers published in academic journals of Administrative Law in the period 2014-first quarter of 2015.
International scholars working on better regulation and regulatory agencies are encouraged to notify the Observatory of their recent publications to be included in the next Bulletin by sending a message to literature[at]osservatorioair.it.
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SPECIAL ISSUES & SIMPOSIA
Agency Oversight
- Agency Avoidance of OIRA and the Administrative Procedure Act, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 37, No. 2, Spring 2014.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
- Benefit-Cost Analysis of Financial Regulation: A Conference, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 43, No. S2, June 2014.
- The Costs and Benefits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, Irvine Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, December 2014.
- The Limits of Quantification, California Law Review, Vol. 102, No. 6, December 2014.
- Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 124, January 2015.
Judicial Review
- Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 2, November 2014.
ARTICLES
Agency Oversight
- Davidson, M.N. and E.J. Leib. 2015. Regleprudence at OIRA and Beyond, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 103, No. 2, pp. 259-315.
- Graham, J. and J.W. Broughel. 2015. Stealth Regulation: Addressing Agency Evasion of OIRA and the Administrative Procedure Act, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 30-54.
- Nou, J. 2015. Agency Coordinators Outside of the Executive Branch. The Search for Effective Interagency Oversight, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 128, No. 3, Forum, pp. 64-74.
- Shah, B. 2015. Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 123, No. 3, pp. 805-882.
Behavioral Law and Economics
- Baldwin, R. 2014. From Regulation to Behavior Change: Giving Nudge the Third Degree, Modern Law Review, Vol. 77, No.6, pp. 831-857.
- Bubb, R. and R.H. Pildes. 2014. How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 127, No. 6, pp. 1593-1678.
- Hayashi, A., M.A. Livermore and Q. Curtis. 2014. Tacking in Shifting Winds: Choice-preserving Regulation Recognizes the Uncertainty in Behavioral Models, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 127, No. 6, Forum, pp. 204-209.
- Sunstein, C.R. 2014. Nudges vs Shoves. Five Reasons for Choice-Preserving Approaches, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 127, No. 6, Forum, pp. 210-217.
Benefit-Cost Analysis
- Livermore, M.A. 2014. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 609-687.
- Vladeck, J. 2014. Valuing Regulatory Flexibility: A Real Options Approach to Cost-Benefit Analysis, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 103, No. 3, pp. 797-824.
Consultation and Participation
- Marxsen, C. 2014. Open Stakeholders Consultations at the European Level: Voice of the Citizens?, European Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 257-280.
- Smismans, S. 2014. Regulating Interest Group in the European Union, European Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 470-492.
Judicial Review
- Hammond, E. 2015. Response: Administrative Law’s Asymmetries of Statutory Origin, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, pp. 75-84.
- Jordao, E. and S. Rose-Ackerman. 2014. Judicial Review of Executive Policymaking in Advanced Democracies: Beyond Rights Review, Administrative Law Review, Vol. 66, No. 1, pp. 1-72.
- Krishnakumar, A.S. 2015. Longstanding Agency Interpretations, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 1823-1907.
- Shami, A. 2014. Three steps forward: shared regulatory space, deference, and the role of the court, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 1577-1620.
- Wasserman, M. 2015. Deference Asymmetries: Distortions in the Evolution of Regulatory Law, Texas Law Review, Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 625-678.
Regulatory Agencies
- Adamski, D. 2014. The ESMA Doctrine: A Constitutional Revolution and the Economics of Delegation, European Law Review, No. 6, pp. 812-834.
- Botelho Moniz, C, and P. de Gouveia e Melo. 2015. The New Framework Law on Independent Regulatory Agencies in Portugal, European Public Law, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 3-29.
- Bubb, R. and P.L. Warren. 2014. Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 95-135.
- Calvani, T. and A.M. Diveley. 2014. The FTC at 100: A Modest Proposal for Change, George Mason Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 1169-1189.
- Codini, E. and S.A. Frego Luppi. 2014. Independence of Regulatory Authorities: The Italian Case, European Public Law, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 499-519.
- Kovacic, W.E. 2015. Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies Signal Quality, George Mason Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 237-258.
- Sunstein, C.R. and A. Vermeule. 2014. The Law of “Not Now”: When Agencies Defer Decisions, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 103, No. 1, pp. 157-195.
(articles selected by Paola Adami, Mariangela Benedetti and Barbara Neri)