Behavioral law and economics

• Atamer, Y. M. 2017.Why Judicial Control of Price Terms in Consumer Contracts Might Not Always Be the Right Answer – Insights from Behavioural Law and Economics, The Modern Law Review, 80(4):624–660.
• Galle, B. 2017. A response: what’s in a nudge?, Administrative Law Review Accord, 3(1): 1-18.
• Parella, K. 2018. Reputational Regulation, Duke Law Journal, 67(5): 907-979.

Burden reduction/Deregulation

• Ben-Shahar, O. and Chilton A., 2016. Simplification of Privacy Disclosures: An Experimental Test, Journal of Legal Studies, 45(2): 41–67.
• Bethany, D. N. and Grab, D. 2017. Deregulation: Process and Procedures That Govern Agency Decisionmaking in An Era of Rollbacks, Energy Law Journal, 38(2):269-295.
• Miller, S.E. and Dudley, S.E. 2016. Regulatory accretion: causes and possible remedies, Administrative Law Review Accord, 1(2): 98-114.
• Shepard, S.A. 2014. A negative externality by any other name: using emissions caps as models for constraining deadweight costs of regulation, Administrative Law Review, 66(2): 345-408.

Cost- Benefit Analysis

• Stiglitz, E. 2017. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Public Sector Trust, Supreme Court Economic Review, 17-20: 1-21.
• Sunstein, C.S. 2017. Cost-benefit analysis and arbitrariness review,Harvard Environmental Law Review, 41(1): 1-41.
• White, J.T. 2016. Quantified Cost–Benefit Analysis at the SEC, Administrative Law Review Accord, 2(1): 53-79.

Transparency and Accountability

• Conti-Brown, P. 2016. Ulysses and the punch bowl: the governance, accountability, and independence of the Federal Reserve, George Mason Law Review, 24(2): 617-633.
• Curtin, D. 2017. ‘Accountable Independence’ of the European Central Bank: Seeing the Logics of Transparency, European Law Journal, 23(1-2): 28-44.
• Goldoni, M. 2016. The limits of legal accountability of the European Central Bank, George Mason Law Review, 24(2): 595-616.
• Menéndez, A.J. 2017. Democracy, Translucidity and Accountability: The Eurozone vs. The Democratic Right to Know, 23(1-2): 2-8.
• Peers, S.  and Costa, M. 2016. Reassessing the Accountability of European Union Decentralized Agencies: Mind the Independence Gap, European Public Law, 22(4): 645–665.

Judicial review

• Bagley, N. 2017. Remedial restraint in administrative law, Columbia Law Review, 117(2): 253-318.
• Bamzai, A. 2017. The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, The Yale Law Journal, 126 (4).
• Coleman, J.W. 2016. Policymaking By Proposal: How Agencies Are Transforming Industry Investment Long Before Rules Can Be Tested In Court, George Mason Law Review, 24(2): 497-532.
• Daly, P. 2017. The Court and Administrative Law: Models of Rights Protection, Supreme Court Law Review, (19): 57-79.
• Hammond, E. 2016. Double deference in administrative law, Columbia Law Review, 116(7): 1705-1772.
• Hemel, D. J. and  Nielson, A. L. 2016. Chevron Step One-and-a-Half,The University of Chicago Law Review, 84(2):757-824.
• Hylas, S. 2017. Final Agency Action in the Administrative Procedure Act, New York University Law Review, 92(5): 1644-1682.
• Macey, J.C. 2017. Playing Nicely: How Judges Can Improve Dodd-Frank and Foster Interagency Collaboration, The Yale Law Journal, 126 (3).
• Nielson, A.L. 2017.  Beyond Seminole Rock, The Georgetown Law Journal,105(4):943-1000.
• Sunstein, C. R. and Vermeule, A. 2016. The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, The University of Chicago Law Review, 84(1):297-321.
• Tomkins, A. 2016.The Guardianship of the Public Interest: a British Tale of Contestable Administrative Law, George Mason Law Review, 24(2): 417-451.
• Walker, C.J. 2017. Against remedial restraint in administrative law, Columbia Law Review, 117(3): 106-126.
• Warren, F.D. 2018. The Impact of weakening Chevron deference on environmental deregulation, Columbia Law Review, 118(2): 62-80.
• Werntz, H.M. 2017. Counting on Chevron?, Energy Law Journal, 38(2):297-358.

Regulatory Agencies’ Design and Political Control

• Berry, C.R. and Gersen, J.E. 2017.Agency Design and Political Control, The Yale Law Journal, 126 (4).
• Coglianese, C. 2017. The Limits of Performance-Based Regulation, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 50(3): 525-563.
• Coglianese, C. and Lehr, D. 2017. Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, The Georgetown Law Journal, 105(5):1147-1223.
• Cohen, J.E. 2016. The Regulatory State in the Information Age, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 17(2): 369-414.
• Chiti, E. 2016. Is EU Administrative Law Failing in Some of Its Crucial Tasks?, European Law Journal, 22(5): 576-596.
• Freeman, J. 2017. The uncomfortable convergence of energy and environmental law, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 41(2):339-421.
• Nielson, A. 2018. Sticky Regulations, The University of Chicago Law Review, 85(1):85-143.
• Nou, J. 2017. Subdelegating powers, Columbia Law Review, 117(2): 473-526.
• Sohoni, M. 2017. On dollars and deference: agencies, spending, and economic rights, Duke Law Journal, 66(8): 1677-1726.
• Turk, M. C., 2017. Regulation by Settlement, Kansas Law Review,  66 (2): 259-324.
• Wagner, W., West, W., McGarity, T., Peters, L. 2017. Dynamic Rulemaking, New York University Law Review, 92: 183-266.
• Weiser, P. 2017. Entrepreneurial Administration, University of Colorado Law Legal Studies, 16(11): 1-70.
• Wurman, I. 2017. Constitutional Administration, Stanford Law Review, 69(2):359-434.

Participation and Consultation

• Aitamurto, T. and Kaiping, C. 2017. The value of crowdsourcing in public policymaking: epistemic, democratic and economic value, The Theory and Practice of Legislation, 5(1): 55-72.
• Morantz, A.D. 2017. What Unions Do for Regulation,  Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 13: 515–534.
• Pečarič, M. 2017. Can a group of people be smarter than experts?, The Theory and Practice of Legislation, 5 (1): 5-29.
• Ranchordás, S. 2017. Digital agoras: democratic legitimacy, online participation and the case of Uber-petitions, The Theory and Practice of Legislation, 5(1): 31-54.
• Ranchordás, S. and  Voermans, W. 2017. Crowdsourcing legislation: new ways of engaging the public, The Theory and Practice of Legislation, 5(1): 1-4.

EU’s Better Regulation Agenda: Special Issue

• Eliantonio, M. 2017. Alternative Forms of Regulation: Are They Really ‘Better’ Regulation?, European Journal of Law Reform, (1-2).
• Eliantonio, M. and Spendzharova, A. 2017. The European Union’s New “Better Regulation” Agenda: between Procedures and Politics, European Journal of Law Reform, (1-2).
• Meuwese, A.C.M. 2017. Regulatory Review of European Commission Impact Assessments, European Journal of Law Reform, (1-2).
• Ranchordás, S. 2017. Consultations, Citizen Narratives and Evidence-Based Regulation, European Journal of Law Reform, (1-2).
• Smismans, S. 2017. The Politicization of Ex Post Evaluation in the EU, European Journal of Law Reform, (1-2).
• Stephenson, P. 2017. Why Better Regulation Demands Better Scrutiny of Results, European Journal of Law Reform, (1-2).
• Verbruggen, P. 2017. Private Regulation in EU Better Regulation, European Journal of Law Reform, (1-2).

Working papers

• Allen, H.J. 2017. A US Regulatory Sandbox?, SSRN papers.
• Blumstein, J. F., 2017. Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 17-37.
• Coglianese, C. 2017. Improving Regulatory Analysis at Independent Agencies, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Research Paper no. 17-38.
• Kwoka, M.B. 2017. First-Person FOIA, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, Legal Research Paper Series –Working Paper No. 17-26.
• Levin, R.M. 2017. Making Sense of Issue Exhaustion in Rulemaking, Washington University Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No. 17-10-03.
• McHarg, A. 2017. Administrative Discretion, Administrative Rule-Making and Judicial Review, SSRN papers.
• Van der Sluijs, J. 2017. Regulatory Impact Assessment – The Swedish Example, Faculty of Law, Stockholm University Research Paper No. 6.
• Zamir, E. and Teichman, D. 2017. Behavioral Law and Economics: Administrative, Constitutional, and International Law. Behavioral Law and Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Legal Research Paper No. 17-36.
• Markell, D.L. 2017. Agency Motivations in Exercising Discretion, FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 830, 1-8.

(Articles selected by Paola Adami and Barbara Neri)