Literature Bulletin 2019 on regulatory governance and better regulation: Administrative law publications

by Giorgio Mocavini

The Annual Bulletin assembles reference to papers that have been released throughout 2019. It has been compiled from a number of major journals in the field of administrative law. We have aimed at a balanced and assorted selection of articles focusing on key topics in the field of regulatory governance and better regulation.

Burden reduction/Deregulation

• Belton, K.B. and Graham, J.D. 2019, Trump’s deregulation record: is it working?, Administrative Law Review, 71(4): 803-880.
• Chimienti, V. 2019, The new regulation governing AIR, VIR and consultation. A further step forward toward ‘better regulation’ in Italy, European Journal of Law Reform, (4).

• McGarity, T.O. and Wagner, W.E. 2019, Deregulation using stealth “science” strategy, Duke Law Journal, 68(8): 1719-1803.
• Rangone, N. 2019, Semplificazione ed effettività dei controlli sulle imprese, Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, 69(3): 883-913.
• Sunstein, C.R. 2019, Sludge and ordeals, Duke Law Journal, 68(8): 1843-1883.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

• Cecot, C. 2019, Deregulatory cost-benefit analysis and regulatory stability, Duke Law Journal, 68(8): 1593-1650.
• Masur, J.S. and Posner, E.A. 2019, Norming in administrative Law, Duke Law Journal, 68(7): 1383-1431.

Judicial Review

• Bonomi, M.S. 2019, Il potere di rettifica del prezzo dell’OPA e la certezza del diritto, Giornale di diritto amministrativo, (4): 513-524. 
• Borgogno, O. and Colangelo, G. 2019, Analisi antitrust delle piattaforme a due versanti: lo scenario dopo il caso AmEx, Mercato concorrenza regole, (1): 57-80.
• Buzbee, W.W. 2019, Agency statutory abnegation in the deregulatory playbook, Duke Law Journal, 68(8): 1509-1591.
• Dotan, Y. 2019, Deference and disagreement in administrative law, Administrative Law Review, 71(4): 761-801.
• Glicksman, R.L. and Hammond, E. 2019, The administrative law of regulatory slop and strategy, Duke Law Journal, 68(8): 1651-1717.
• Randy, J.K. 2019, Statutory interpretation, administrative deference and the law of stare decisis, Texas Law Review, 97(6): 1125-1162. 
• Turchini, V. 2019, L’antitrust non è un giudice nemmeno “ai limitati fini”, Giornale di diritto amministrativo, (4): 467-477.

Regulation and Technological Change

• Bloodstein, B. 2019, Amazon and platform antitrust, Fordham Law Review, 88(1): 187-230.
• Langvart, K. 2019, Regulating habit-forming technology, Fordham Law Review, 88(1):129-185.
• Macchiavello, E. 2019, La regolazione del FinTech tra innovazione, esigenze di tutela e level playing field. L’inesplorato caso dell’invoice trading, Banca Impresa Società (3): 497-534.
• Manzini, P. 2019, Algoritmi collusivi e diritto antitrust europeo, Mercato Concorrenza Regole, (1): 163-184.
• Newman, J.M. 2019, Antitrust in digital markets, Vanderbilt Law Review, 72(5): 1497-1561.
• Osti, C. and Pardolesi, R. 2019, L’antitrust ai tempi di Facebook, Mercato concorrenza regole, (2): 195-218.
• Pacini, M. 2019, La tassazione delle multinazionali digitali nell’arena globale degli interessi economici, Giornale di diritto amministrativo, (2): 35-43.
• Tschider, C.A. 2019, Regulating the internet of things: discrimination, privacy, and cybersecurity in the artificial intelligence age, Denver Law Review, 96(1): 87-143.
• Tzur, A. 2019, Uber Über regulation? Regulatory change following the emergence of new technologies in the taxi market, Regulation & Governance, 13(3): 340-361.
• Van Loo, R. 2019, The missing regulatory State: monitoring businesses in an age of surveillance, Vanderbilt Law Review, 72(5): 1563-1631.
• Yeung, K. 2019, Regulation by blockchain: the emerging battle for supremacy between the code of law and code as law, Modern Law Review, 82(2): 207-239.

Regulatory Agencies’ Design and Political Control

• Bamzai, A. 2019, Delegation and interpretive discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the formation and future of administrative law, Harvard Law Review, 133(1): 164-199.
• Becker, M. 2019, When public principals give up control over private agents: the new independence of ICANN in internet governance, Regulation & Governance, 13(4): 561-576.
• Chou, M. 2019, Agency interpretations of executive orders, Administrative Law Review, 71(3): 555-605.
• Coglianese, C. 2019, Dimensions of delegation, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 167: 1849-1889.
• Cucinotta, A. 2019, La «mano invisibile» e l’antitrust tra scienza e mito, Mercato concorrenza regole, (1): 9-30.
• D’Urbano, A. 2019, Perché l’Agcm non può sollevare questione di costituzionalità. Il difetto di terzietà e l’insufficienza del contraddittorio «verticale», Mercato concorrenza regole, (1): 95-124.
• Edgar, A. and Stack, K.M. 2019, The authority and interpretation of regulations, Modern Law Review, 82(6):1009-1033.
• Godi, M. 2019, Beyond nudging: debiasing consumers through mixed framing, The Yale Law Journal, 128(7): 1792-2121.
• Guarnieri, E. 2019, Un riparto di giurisdizione per le sanzioni di Banca d’Italia e di Consob?, Banca impresa società (3): 559-594.
• Lin, A.C. 2019, President Trump’s war on regulatory science, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 43(2): 247-306.
• Nou, J. and Stiglitz, E.H. 2019, Regulatory bundling, The Yale Law Journal, 128(5): 1174-1477.
• Pardolesi, R. 2019, Hipster antitrust e sconvolgimenti tettonici: «back to the future»?, Mercato concorrenza regole, (1): 81-94.
• Richardson, D. 2019, Congressional control of agency expertise, Virginia Law Review, 105(1): 173-261.
• Roesler, S. 2019, Agency reasons at the intersection of expertise and presidential preferences, Administrative Law Review, 71(3): 491-554.
• Sabbatini, P. 2019, Quanti benefici dall’intervento antitrust? Una valutazione da tre diversi punti di vista, Mercato concorrenza regole, (1): 31-56.
• Shapiro, S.A. 2019, Rulemaking inaction and the failure of administrative law, Duke Law Journal, 68(8): 1805-1842.
• Sitaraman, G. and Dobkin, A. 2019, The choice between single director and multimember commissions, Administrative Law Review, 71(4): 719-760.
• Van Loo, R. 2019, Regulatory monitors: policing firms in the compliance era, Columbia Law Review, 119(2): 369-444.

Regulatory Intermediaries

• Brès, L., Mena, S., and Salles-Djelic, M.-L. 2019, Exploring the formal and informal roles of regulatory intermediaries in transnational multistakeholder regulation, Regulation & Governance, 13(2): 127-140.
• Carter, D.P. and Mahallati, N. 2019, Coordinating intermediaries: the prospects and limitations of professional associations in decentralized regulation, Regulation & Governance, 13(1): 51-69.
• Kourula, A., Paukku, M., Peterman, A. and Koria, M. 2019, Intermediary roles in regulatory programs: toward a role‐based framework, Regulation & Governance, 13(2): 141-156.

Transparency, Accountability and Participation

• DeMenno, M.B. 2019, Technocracy, democracy, and public policy: An evaluation of public participation in retrospective regulatory review, Regulation & Governance, 13(3): 362-383.
• Kaminski, M.E. 2019, Binary governance: lessons from GDPR’s approach to algorithmic accountability, Southern California Law Review, 92(6): 1529-1616.
• Marques, J.C. 2019, Private regulatory capture via harmonization: an analysis of global retailer regulatory intermediaries, Regulation & Governance, 13(2): 157-176.
• Parrillo, N.R. 2019, Should the public get to participate before federal agencies issue guidance? An empirical study, Administrative Law Review, 71(1): 57-125.
• Walters, D.E. 2019, Capturing the regulatory agenda: an empirical study of agency responsiveness to rulemaking petition, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 43(1): 175-223.